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ABSTRACT 
THE EFFECT OF NUTRITION LABELLING ON FAST-FOOD NUTRITIONAL 
CONTENT 
MAY 2020 
JOSHUA J REED, B.A. THE COLLEGE OF NEW JERSEY 
M.S. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Nathalie Lavoie and Professor Emily Wang 
 
Abstract: The United States has implemented many policies to target obesity. Recently, 
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration has mandated that restaurants must label the 
calorie content of the food they provide on menus and menu boards. Previous literature 
suggests that this policy will cause a small subset of consumers to improve the nutritional 
quality of the food they consume. Restaurants’ responses to the policy are not as well 
studied but existing literature suggests that menu items become slightly healthier after the 
introduction of various local policies. This paper seeks to assess the impact of a 
nationally-instituted nutrition labelling policy on fast-food nutritional content. We find 
evidence that restaurants both improve the healthfulness of pre-existing food items and 
introduce new food items of substantially lower nutritional quality. 
Disclaimer: Part of this thesis was written in collaboration with my advisors, Dr. 
Nathalie Lavoie, and Dr. Emily Wang, in the context of a grant proposal. The data 
collection process was done in large part by Dr. Qihong Liu.  
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
Obesity is now widely acknowledged as a leading public health crisis affecting the 
United States and much of the developed world. It is estimated that obesity imposes a social 
cost of $117 billion in the United States alone (Komesaroff and Thomas, 2007). The U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services found a prevalence of obesity of about 40 
percent in adults and 19 percent in youths, and this prevalence has been steadily increasing 
(Hales et al, 2017). Poor diets are a key contributing factor to obesity (Lin and Guthrie, 
2012), which in turn is linked to mortality from heart disease, stroke, and type 2 diabetes 
(Micha et al., 2017). Broadly separating individual’s diet into two components, food-at-
home and food-away-from-home, our proposed research focuses on effect of policies 
intended to decrease obesity on the latter with this paper focusing specifically on fast-food.  
Food-away-from-home (FAFH) has taken increasing importance in our diet. Spending 
on FAFH first surpassed spending on food at home in 2010 (Saksena et al., 2018) and in 
2019, the industry took in an unprecedented $863 billion in revenue (Nation’s Restaurant 
News). This figure out competes the total revenue in grocery sales, $674 billion, by nearly 
$200 billion, speaking to the importance of food-away-from-home. The increasing 
importance of FAFH is magnified by its nutritional profile, i.e., poorer quality and more 
caloric than food at home. It contains more saturated fats and sodium, and less calcium, 
iron, and fiber than food at home (Saksena et al., 2018). 
As consumer preferences shift, restaurants are coming under increasing examination 
regarding the nutritional quality of the products they offer. Between 1977 and 2008, 
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Americans increased their away-from-home caloric intake from 18 percent to 32 percent 
(Lin and Guthrie, 2012). Restaurants have increased in importance to American diets and 
this trend is likely to continue. Given this, the role of FAFH in obesity is important to 
consider. 
 This thesis assesses fast-food restaurants’ strategic responses to policy that requires 
overt disclosure of nutritional content of their menu items. Specifically, when they are 
required to label calories next to menu items on menus and menu boards. We find evidence 
that firms reformulate items to be more healthful and introduce new items which are less 
healthful. One potential explanation for this pattern is that firms want to appeal to both 
health-conscious consumers and to consumers who prefer taste over nutritional quality.  
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND 
One potential remedy to the obesity and general poor diet crisis facing the United 
States is labelling nutritional information to inform consumers about their dietary choices. 
Pre-packaged foods sold in grocery stores have held a nutrition labelling requirement since 
the passage of the Nutrition Labelling and Education Act of 1989-90 (H.R.3562). A 
retrospective FDA (2018a) review of this policy found that benefits, in the form of gains 
to consumer welfare, have exceeded costs, in the form of regulatory impositions. Recently, 
a similar policy of nutrition labelling was enacted for restaurants. 
On May 7th, 2018, a policy of nutrition labelling on menus and menu boards in 
restaurants was enacted nationally (FDA, 2018b). This paper seeks to assess the impact of 
the nationally instituted nutrition labelling policy on the nutritional quality of food offered 
in U.S. restaurants. 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act signed into law on March 23rd, 
2010, mandated nutrition labelling in restaurants as a national policy (42 U.S.C. § 18001). 
Of interest to this paper is section 6205 which, required the FDA to implement a rule for 
restaurants to:  
1. Label calorie counts adjacent to the relevant item’s name on their menu.  
2. Succinctly state the daily reference value (DRV) of calorie intake (2,000 
calories) on their menu.  
3. Provide consumers with more detailed nutritional information in written 
form at the restaurant and display availability of this information on their menu.  
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These rules apply to standard menu items at restaurants and similar retail food 
establishments; notably, restaurant chains with fewer than 20 locations are exempt from 
this regulation. Additionally, the rule does not apply to items not listed on the menu (e.g. 
condiments), daily specials, temporary menu items (appearing for less than 60 days per 
calendar year), custom orders, or items that are part of a customary market test (appearing 
for less than 90 days). However, self-service food items must be labeled at the point of 
service (42 U.S.C. § 18001, Sec. 4205).  
Implementing this policy proved to be quite controversial and lobbyists managed 
to have it postponed twice (Bokamp, 2017). Critics claimed that the regulation is not 
flexible enough for restaurants that conduct most of their business through delivery and 
imposes unjustified costs (Bokamp, 2017). Advocates claimed it is vital and relatively 
simple for consumers to be informed of the nutritional content of their food (Bokamp, 
2017). A lengthy review of the potential costs and benefits of the policy found substantial 
benefits for minimal costs (FDA, 2011). Eventually, it was instituted by the FDA on May 
7th, 2018 (FDA, 2018b).   
Fast-food is a major industry in the United States generating $273.2 billion in 
revenue in 2019, according to a report by IBIS World (Hyland, 2019). Over the past 5 years 
the industry has experienced substantial growth and is projected to continue growing but 
at a slower rate for the next 5 years. Fast-casual restaurants, such as 5 Guys and Chipotle, 
which offer higher quality food and a more attractive atmosphere have steadily been 
gaining market share. Nevertheless, the market is still dominated by large traditional 
restaurant chain franchisors: The McDonald’s Corporation, The Wendy’s Company, Yum! 
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Brands Inc. (KFC, Taco Bell, and Pizza Hut), Restaurant Brands Inc. (Burger King and 
Popeyes), Domino’s Pizza Inc., and Chick fil-A (Hyland, 2019). 
Fast food restaurants are generally divided into six subtypes: Burger (34.3 percent 
of fast food restaurants), Sandwiches (11.3 percent), Chicken (10.3 percent), Ethnic (9.1 
percent), Pizza and Pasta (8.8 percent) and Other (26 percent) (Hyland, 2019). These 
categorizations are consistent with those used by Nations Restaurant News magazine 
(2019), a well-known industry publication and a useful source for categorizing individual 
restaurants. 
Individual fast-food restaurants are mostly financed and managed by small-
business franchisees, 94.2 percent of establishments have fewer than 50 employees 
(Hyland, 2019). Despite the decentralized nature of fast food restaurant ownership, the 
franchisors of large restaurant chains exercise almost complete control over the food 
offered in their restaurants (Miles, 2018). Large restaurant chains usually have national 
supply arrangements for all their inputs and franchisees are often prohibited from 
purchasing any inputs by other means (Miles, 2018). The nature of franchise agreements 
allows franchisors a high degree of flexibility to change menus and have those changes 
implemented across franchises. 
A study conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) found that fast-
food has continually increased in importance to American diets (Lin and Guthrie, 2012). 
Americans consume 13 percent of their calories at fast-food restaurants, the largest subset 
of food away from home, increasing from 3 percent in 1977-78. Additionally, food 
prepared away from home has been found to have significantly lower nutritional quality 
than food prepared at home. The authors discuss nutrition labelling in restaurants as a 
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feasible remedy to the poor nutritional quality of food prepared away from home. They 
note that nutritional labelling may incentivize consumers to choose healthier options and 
restaurants to offer them. However, people’s food choices may not be entirely rational, 
based more on hunger and sensual pleasure than nutrition (Lin and Guthrie, 2012). It is 
evident that any policy which seeks to address the growing issue of poor nutrition and 
obesity in the United States must focus on food away from home and, specifically, fast 
food. What is less clear is whether nutrition labelling is an effective policy to combat this 
issue. 
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CHAPTER III 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are two potential actors who could change their actions in response to 
nutrition labelling in restaurants, the consumers, and the restaurants themselves. Most of 
the existing literature on this topic focuses on consumer responses to nutrition labelling. In 
general, it finds that consumers respond to the policy by slightly reducing their calorie 
intake and intake of other overconsumed nutrients.  
Bollinger, Leslie, and Sorenson (2010) had access to detailed purchase data from 
Starbucks and used it to provide an important addition to the literature. The authors utilize 
a difference-in-difference design to assess the impact of a New York City (NYC) menu 
labelling regulation 3 months before and 11 months after its implementation. This NYC 
policy was similar to the now nationally mandated policy.  They find that calories per 
transaction fall by approximately 6 percent in NYC relative to Philadelphia and Boston. 
However, calorie reductions are limited to food items, not beverages. Furthermore, 
although the reduction in calories is significant, it is small and would only translate to a 
small decrease in obesity. Additionally, there is a degree of heterogeneity of the effect of 
posting the calorie information; college educated people, women, and people with higher 
incomes were more likely to consume fewer calories (Bollinger, Leslie, and Sorenson, 
2010). Overall, this study presents a clear example of calorie labelling decreasing calorie 
consumption by some consumers in a market setting.  
Green, Brown, and Ohri-Vachaspati (2015) examine the socio-demographic 
disparities and the likelihood of customers using McDonald’s internally mandated calorie 
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menu labels. The study found that more educated and higher income individuals were 
significantly more likely to report using calorie labels and reduce their calorie intake 
(Green, Brown, and Ohri-Vachaspati, 2015). Ebel et al. (2009) study the purchasing 
decisions of adults in low-income neighborhoods in New York City when presented with 
a locally instituted policy which is like the now nationally implemented policy. Many 
people reported that they noticed the menu labels and, as a result, reported purchasing fewer 
calories. However, their purchase decisions were not significantly different from those who 
did not notice the labels (Ebel et al. 2009). Yamamoto et al. (2004) conducted a similar 
experiment and find that when young subjects are presented with menus with and without 
calorie labels, they significantly reduced their calorie intake. While many consumers are 
not very well informed on how to use nutritional information to better their dietary choices, 
this misinformation is differentially distributed across demographics. 
It has been firmly established by previous literature that nutrition labelling on 
menus and menu boards does cause some consumers to notice and respond to the labels by 
choosing healthier options. A meta-analysis of recent studies has affirmed this conclusion, 
finding reductions of 77.8 kcal consumed per consumer because of nutrition labelling 
policy (Littlewood et al., 2015). However, this effect is heterogenous across demographics. 
Furthermore, effects are not large enough to translate to a real change in obesity. What is 
not so well established is the firms’ responses to changes in consumer preferences when 
they are mandated to display calorie content information. The few studies that have been 
done on locally implemented policies suggest a modest improvement in the nutritional 
quality of menu items after the policies went into effect.  
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Namba et al. (2013) is one such study that focused on fast food restaurant chains. 
They observe 5 treatment chains who operated in areas which required nutrition labelling, 
between 2005 and 2011, and 4 which did not. Menu labelling requirements began with the 
implementation of the NYC policy in 2008.  They observed the proportion of food items 
that were “healthier” based on DRV for a 2,000-calorie diet, U.S. FDA guidelines, and the 
dietary guidelines for Americans from the USDA. The authors found that restaurants which 
were subject to the nutrition labelling policy began offering a significantly higher 
proportion of “healthier” menu items after being subject to the policy. (Namba et al. 2013).  
Breummer, Krieger, Salens, and Chan (2012) utilized a sample of restaurants in 
King County, Washington which instituted a similar policy to the now national policy in 
2009. The authors observed calorie counts of restaurant entrées before and after the policy 
went into effect. They found significant, but small, differences in the calorie content of 
fast-food menu items after the policy went into effect. Additionally, they observed 
saturated fat and sodium but did not find many significant differences. Overall, larger 
reductions were observed at sit-down than fast-food restaurants (Breummer, Krieger, 
Salens, and Chan, 2012).  These studies observed calorie reductions from locally instituted 
nutrition labelling in restaurant mandates, it stands to reason that the national policy should 
have an even more substantial effect. 
The limited literature on supply-side effects of nutrition labelling in restaurants has 
found small but significant improvements in the overall nutritional quality of menu items. 
However, further research is necessary to examine the effects of the policy more broadly 
and with respect to the recently implemented national policy. 
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While few articles have examined the supply-side effects of mandatory calorie labeling, 
a broader literature exists on the effects of quality disclosure. Dranove and Jin (2010) 
conclude that the empirical literature finds little evidence that sellers respond to mandatory 
quality disclosure by increasing quality.  
Many studies find quality disclosure mandates to have their intended effect in raising 
quality. Jin and Leslie (2003) find that restaurant provision of hygiene quality in the form 
of a health card causes an increase in the average hygiene scores of restaurants. The result 
applies to both voluntary and mandatory disclosure. Bennear and Olmstead (2008), using 
a difference-in-difference approach, find that mandatory disclosure of water quality 
reduces water quality violations. Ippolito and Mathios (1990) examine consumers and 
producers’ decisions in the ready-to-eat cereal market under government-provided 
information and advertising. They find that allowing firms to advertise about fiber contents 
led to an increase in development of fiber cereals. While it is desirable for policymakers 
that quality mandates improve quality, it is not always the case.  
Several articles find that mandatory quality disclosure leads to unintended outcomes, 
i.e., affected firms find ways to circumvent the law to their benefit. This is true across 
industries: health care, education, and the environment. Dranove et al. (2003) argue that 
the disclosure of patient health outcomes either at the physician or hospital level may lead 
to selection bias, i.e., physicians/hospitals may refuse to treat severely ill patients or those 
more difficult to treat. Lu (2012) examines the effect of the Nursing Home Quality 
Initiative (NHQI) and finds that scores for reported dimensions of quality increase, while 
the scores for unreported dimensions deteriorate such that overall quality does not improve. 
Jacob (2005) examines the effect of the U.S. “No Child Left Behind” policy that requires 
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testing of students in grades 3-8. Mathematics and reading achievements increase 
significantly after the implementation of the policy, strategic behaviors by teachers is also 
observed such as focusing on test-specific skills, substituting lower stake subjects for high 
stake ones, increasing special education placements, and preemptively retaining students. 
Powers et al. (2011) find that disclosing environmental performance of individual pulp and 
paper plants in India led to a significant reduction in pollution for the dirtiest plants, but 
not for the cleaner ones. They found that plants located in wealthier communities were 
more likely to reduce emissions as well as single-plant firms. 
Overall, the literature on quality disclosure suggests that mandatory labeling of calorie 
information may lead restaurants to reduce calories. Competitive effects may be such that 
an increase in differentiation could be observed to soften price competition, i.e., an increase 
in calories for some restaurants, and decrease in calories for others. In addition, the results 
suggest that mandatory disclosure of calories could lead firms to alter other choice 
variables (nutrition characteristics or other) to their benefit.  
This paper seeks to add to the literature on quality disclosure in general and fast-food 
restaurants’ responses to the national nutrition labelling mandate in specific. As such, we 
analyze restaurants’ strategic response to the policy from a nutrition perspective.   
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA 
This project entails a significant data collection effort to accurately represent the state 
of nutrition at restaurants across the United States both big (20 or more locations, directly 
affected by the policy) and small (less than 20 locations, not directly affected by the policy). 
Restaurant menu offerings and their nutrition information are collected both prior to and 
following the passage and implementation of the mandatory disclosure policy. Post 
collection, the data require digitization and formatting before analyses can begin. Below, 
we document the data collection and the data preparation process. 
Data Collection Process 
The project requires the use of a panel of detailed restaurant menu offerings and 
nutrition information for each of the items offered. To form the sample of our large 
restaurant chains, we draw restaurants from Nation’s Restaurant News, which ranks 
restaurants based on their total sales. Out of the reported top 200 restaurants, we were able 
to successfully collect data from 113 restaurants. The remaining restaurants either did not 
report nutrition information before the policy took effect or reported it in a way that was 
not conducive to collection (e.g. requiring going through several webpages for each menu 
item.) Our resulting sample, as documented in Table 1 below, well represents all large 
restaurant chains in the United States. As shown, the distribution of restaurants in our 
sample matches those in the population of top restaurants reasonably well. This paper 
focuses specifically on fast-food restaurants, those being restaurants identified as LSR 
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limited-service restaurants) but also pizza, chicken, beverage-snack, and bakery-café. Of 
which, there are 52 restaurants’ nutritional information in the dataset we analyze. 
Our sample also includes a diverse mix of restaurants, not only in terms of their types 
but also in terms of their total sales. Some restaurant chains on the top 200 list are very 
large, such as number 1, McDonalds with 14,482 locations and over $38 trillion in sales 
annually in the U.S. alone (McDonald’s Newsroom, 2015 and Nation’s Restaurant News, 
2019). There are much smaller restaurants on the list such as number 197, Shari’s Café and 
Pies with 96 locations and $170 million in sales annually (Marum, 2017 and Nation’s 
Restaurant News, 2019). This feature allows us to study heterogeneous restaurant 
responses to the policy along several dimensions.  
For the restaurants in our sample, the data documents nutritional information on 
macronutrients as well as serving sizes and various micronutrients. These include Total 
Calories, Calories from Fat, Total fat (g), Saturated fat (g), Trans fat (g), Cholesterol (mg), 
Sodium (mg), Total carbohydrates (g), Dietary fiber (g), Sugars (g), and Protein (g). These 
are collected for each menu item in each restaurant in every time-period. Collectively, this 
large set of longitudinal information makes it possible for detailed analysis of restaurants’ 
strategic response to the mandatory information disclosure. 
This set of data has been collected for a total 23 distinct periods between March 2016 
and October 2019, encompassing both before and after policy implementation.  
 
 
 
14 
 
Table 1. Nation's Restaurant News Top 200 Proportion of Restaurants  
by Segment 
 
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35%
Bakery-Cafe
Beverage- Snack
Casual Dining
Chicken
C-Store
Family Dining
Family Dining/Buffet
Family Dining/Grill- Buffet
In-Store
LSR/
LSR/ Barbecue
LSR/ Cafeteria
LSR/ Japanese
LSR/ Sandwich
LSR/Burger
LSR/Chinese
LSR/Hot Dog
LSR/Italian
LSR/Mexican
LSR/Noodle
LSR/Seafood
Pizza
Proportion Available in our Sample Proportion in top 200
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Digitization and Preparation Process 
The data collected are formatted as images, with wildly different formats. Just as 
restaurant menus come in all shapes and designs, so are the data in our sample. 
Consequently, the natural next step is digitizing and formatting the data into a clean and 
uniform format for analysis.  
In order to deal with the heterogeneity and complexity of many restaurants’ individual 
reporting mechanisms we have developed a multi-stage data cleaning process which uses 
both automation and manual processes to efficiently clean large amounts of data.  
The first stage in our data preparation process is scanning, where we take the data in 
either HTML or PDF formats and converts it into a spreadsheet format. This step largely 
relies on the use of optical character recognition (OCR) software, such as ABBYY. We 
have been able to mostly automate this process using Python to convert the data in Excel 
spreadsheets.   
While converting images to spreadsheets is an important step, the data still need to 
undergo careful and rigorous preparation before it is fit for analysis. In this next step, we 
focus on cleaning the data such that all observations and variables have uniform formats 
(e.g. all variables are listed horizontally, and observations listed vertically.) We have been 
able to partially automate this process using Python, which dramatically reduces cleaning 
time.  
Finally, we move on to the most labor-intensive portion of the data cleaning process, a 
final manual cleaning of data. At this stage we ensure that all the variables in our dataset 
16 
 
are properly labelled, check for errors in scanning, and manually enter serving size 
information that is specified in the item name.  
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
Summary Statistics and Stylized Facts 
Table 2. shows the average nutritional content of menu items at large American 
fast-food restaurant chains over our collection period. This data only includes food items 
and not most beverages, although it does include beverages intended wholly for dessert 
e.g. milkshakes.  It is apparent that there are outliers in data collection when looking at 
some of the high maximum values present in some of the nutrients measured specifically 
in the measurements of saturated fat, trans fat, cholesterol, and dietary fiber. For the most 
part these measurement error outliers were not prevalent enough to substantially affect the 
average measurement of the nutritional content of menu items and we are in the process of 
identifying and correcting these few errors. The exception is saturated fat which appears to 
be measured differently across restaurants, sometimes in grams and sometimes in 
milligrams, and thus requires further examination before it can be used for analysis.  
However, many of the high observations are reasonable. For example, the 
maximum value of calories, 8,880 is for a tray of 64 brownies intended for a catering event. 
For the most part, restaurants reported calories, total fat, sugar, sodium, and total 
carbohydrates consistently. For that reason and their role as nutrients American’s 
overconsume these are the variables we consider in our analysis. 
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Table 3. shows how the nutritional makeup of the average menu item at U.S. 
restaurants changed before and after the policy went into effect. It appears that the average 
menu item became healthier in terms of calories, which is to say they contained about 25 
fewer calories on average. That represents a reduction in calories of about one-sixth of the 
average can of soda or one percent of the daily reference value of calories. One interesting 
point of note is that the sodium content of the average menu item, which does not affect its 
calories has fallen where one might expect it to increase to compensate for the decrease in 
taste associated with a lower fat and sugar content. 
 
Table 2. Nutritional Averages by Item Category per Menu Item  
at U.S. Limited Service Restaurants with more than 20 locations, 2016-2019 
  Count Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
Calories 143,908 440.7 406.0 0 8,880 
Calories from Fat 123,400 184.7 219.0 0 5,400 
Total Fat (g) 142,989 21.1 26.7 0 2,000 
Saturated Fat (g) 117,434 1,194.6 10,189.7 0 710,710 
Trans Fat (g) 128,411 21.8 242.4 0 7,030 
Sugar (g) 133,011 20.9 33.3 0 1,230 
Sodium (mg) 143,615 796.7 989.0 0 23,990 
Cholesterol (mg) 142,724 80.1 237.8 0 15,900 
Total Carbohydrates (g) 137,250 47.8 47.0 0 1,920 
Dietary Fiber (g) 138,726 5.5 77.5 0 7,030 
Protein (g) 138,768 16.4 20.8 0 472 
Count indicates the number of individual items in the sample. Not every nutrient is 
reported for every item in every time-period 
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While it is interesting to look at the average calories of a menu item it may be 
relevant to examine the nutrient composition by item categories, as in Table 4. That is, 
which portion of the meal it is intended for. For fast-food restaurants items are usually 
listed separately, the nutrition listed for entrées and sides separately instead of together as 
a whole meal as they often are at full-service restaurants. A potentially surprising revelation 
from this is that the average fried potato side dish contains as many calories as the entrée, 
burger, or sandwich portion at fast-food restaurants. 
 Because of the periodic nature of our data collection process, we can observe not 
only the changes in individual menu items but in the menu itself. That is, we can observe 
when new items are added, old items are taken away, and items are reformulated to have 
different nutritional content. For the purposes of analysis, we categorize the ways that a  
restaurant menu can change from the entry, exit, and reformulation of menu items. The  
average calories of menu items with these categorizations can be seen in Table 5. It is worth 
noting that overall menus become healthier on average even when these changes would 
appear to negatively affect healthfulness. Restaurants in general introduce new products 
which are more calorific and did so to a greater extent after the policy went into effect. 
Additionally, restaurants appear to be removing relatively less calorific items after the 
policy. The reformulation variable is interesting because it encompasses two effects. One 
is a selection effect i.e. restaurants may be choosing to reformulate relatively high calorie 
products. The other is the effect of reformulation i.e. restaurants may be reformulating 
products to have fewer calories 
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Table 3. Restaurant Menu Change Between Average Nutrition per Menu Item at 
U.S.  Fast-Food Restaurants with more than 20 Locations Before and After 
Nutrition Labelling Policy, 2016-2019 
  
Pre-Policy,  
May 2018 
Post-Policy, 
May 2018 
Calories 
448.7 423.5 
(418.9) (376.0) 
Calories from Fat 
184.3 185.7 
(229.0) (196.4) 
Total Fat (g) 
21.39 20.52 
(28.59) (22.04) 
Saturated Fat (g) 
1207.0 1168.7 
(9250.7) (11921.2) 
Trans Fat (g) 
28.76 7.563 
(282.7) (124.0) 
Sugar (g) 
22.30 17.89 
(34.94) (29.25) 
Sodium (mg) 
802.6 783.7 
(1029.4) (894.9) 
Cholesterol (mg) 
81.36 77.29 
(270.8) (142.1) 
Total Carbohydrates (g) 
49.12 44.86 
(49.44) (40.95) 
Dietary Fiber (g) 
6.365 3.568 
(90.99) (32.84) 
Protein (g) 
16.37 16.44 
(21.40) (19.37) 
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Table 4. Nutritional Averages by Item Category per Menu Item  
at U.S. Fast-Food Restaurants with more than 20 locations 
  Calories Total Fat (g) Sugar (g) 
Sodium 
(mg) 
Appetizers & Sides 382.8 17.74 14.88 740.7 
  (356.3) (23.73) (26.58) (893.9) 
  
    
Baked Goods 302.9 13.80 19.72 313.1 
  (156.1) (14.13) (14.34) (193.9) 
  
    
Burgers 547.0 31.49 7.941 1062.1 
  (276.5) (19.74) (6.613) (575.9) 
  
    
Catering 1357.9 78.41 37.65 2755.1 
  (1781.5) (129.8) (82.45) (3949.0) 
  
    
Desserts 530.5 22.71 62.26 271.2 
  (342.6) (20.74) (41.75) (266.2) 
  
    
Entrées 564.9 27.72 11.27 1200.7 
  (441.9) (31.21) (17.87) (1091.4) 
  
    
Fried Potatoes 521.6 26.64 5.372 992.3 
  (440.8) (28.91) (12.17) (969.8) 
  
    
Kids 300.0 12.34 10.35 580.0 
  (221.9) (15.52) (15.00) (565.7) 
  
    
Sandwiches 609.0 28.18 7.874 1560.6 
  (367.6) (25.04) (7.049) (1335.8) 
  
    
Salads 262.0 12.47 5.855 1015.9 
  (150.9) (16.05) (5.562) (514.5) 
  
    
Soup 262.0 12.47 5.855 1015.9 
  (150.9) (16.05) (5.562) (514.5) 
  
    
Toppings & 
Ingredients 
127.9 8.627 7.229 265.3 
(181.2) (17.13) (18.67) (377.2) 
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Table 5. Restaurant Menu Change Between Average Calories per Menu Item at U.S. 
Fast-Food Restaurants with more than 20 locations Before and After Nutrition 
Labelling Policy, 2016-2019 
` 
Pre-Policy,  
May 2018 
Post-Policy, 
May 2018 Description 
Constant Menu Item     Items which are present in both 
the current period and a 
subsequent period with no 
changes to their calorie content 
from the previous period. 
  Mean Calories 450 408 
  SD Calories 383 361 
  n 80,455 39,026 
        
Entry     
Items which are present the 
current and future periods but not 
any previous periods. 
  Mean Calories 458 597 
  SD Calories 570 475 
  n 5,271 3,105 
        
Exit     
Items which are present in the 
current period but not any 
subsequent period with no 
changes to their calorie content. 
  Mean Calories 461 414 
  SD Calories 452 328 
  n 5,148 1,528 
        
Entry*Exit     
Items which are not present in 
any previous period nor any 
subsequent period i.e. items 
which are only observed once. 
  Mean Calories 472 558 
  SD Calories 802 345 
  n 2,469 166 
        
Reformulation     Items which are present in both a 
previous period and a subsequent 
period but with changes to their 
calorie content from the previous 
period. 
  Mean Calories 414 457 
  SD Calories 430 471 
  n 4,344 1,588 
        
Reformulation*Exit     Items which are present in the 
current period but not any 
subsequent period with changes 
to their calorie content from the 
previous period. 
  Mean Calories 288 544 
  SD Calories 591 300 
  n 759 49 
        
Total Sample Size 98,446 45,462 143,908 
Note: In this table each observation is counted only once, i.e. there is no intersection between Entry, Exit, 
and Entry*Exit. 
The first observation for a restaurant is not counted as entry and the last not counted as exit.  
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Reduced-Form Estimation  
Overall, we are interested in the nutritional quality of menu items which can be 
measured not just in calories but other nutritional characteristics such as fat, sugar, 
carbohydrates, and sodium. Using variables described in Table 5. specifically, those related 
to the menu changes Entry, Exit, Reformulation, and their interactions as explanatory 
variables. Our main specification is: 
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝜃 + 𝛽𝐷𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼(𝐷𝑠𝑡 × 𝐷𝑖𝑡) + 𝜉𝑖 +φ𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 
where the subscript i denotes the individual menu item. Subscript s denotes the 
subset of the data, if the observation fell into one of the categories previously discussed. 
Subscript t denotes time representing the collection period. Yist is the measure of the nutrient 
on question: calories, total fat, sugar, carbohydrates, or sodium. Dst is a dummy variable 
which takes the value 1 if the menu item has changed in one of the previously discussed 
ways in that period and 0 otherwise, and Dt a dummy which takes the value 1 if the 
observation is after the time that the policy went into effect and 0 otherwise. Thus, (Ds x 
Dt) takes the value of 1 if the menu item experienced a change after the policy went into 
effect and 0 otherwise. ξ, φ, and τ represent fixed effects. ξ is the restaurant segment fixed 
effect following the designations discussed in Table 1. φ captures item category fixed 
effects as discussed in Table 4. τ captures fixed effects by month including seasonality. εist, 
captures any random shocks. 
Table 6. shows the results of this estimation, we have controlled for month, 
restaurant segment, and food-category fixed effects to ensure that these results are not 
driven by seasonality or specialization. When firms introduced new menu items, Entry, 
they generally had higher calories, fat, sugar, and sodium content than other items on the 
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menu. This effect was even greater after the policy, Entry*Post, except for sugar content 
where newly introduced products had marginally lower the sugar content.  In general, the 
elimination of products, Exit, resulted in less healthy products being eliminated. Although 
after the policy went into effect there were few additional effects on the elimination of 
products, Exit*Post shows no strong pattern. The exception once again is sugar where after 
the policy, controlling for fixed effects, restaurants were eliminating products with a 
marginally lower sugar content on average. Generally, restaurants introduced new products 
which were less healthful but also eliminated less healthful products.  
Turning now to our measure of reformulation in Table 6. this variable describes a 
menu item which had a change to calorie content from the previous observation. Thus, it 
captures two effects, first is the actual effect of reformulation, how the product changed 
from the previous period to the current period. However, it also captures a selection effect, 
that is the effect of restaurants choosing which products to reformulate. It could, therefore, 
be the case that fast-food restaurants were choosing high calorie products to reformulate 
and reformulating them to have lower calories after the policy went into effect. We further 
explore this hypothesis in the analysis presented in Table 7.  
In Table 7. I analyze a modified dataset from that presented in Table 6. wherein we 
asses only data for reformulated products in the period after their reformulation and one 
period before their reformulation. As such, this analysis seeks to capture only the 
reformulation effect and not the selection effect of fast-food restaurants changing the 
nutritional content of their products. This analysis reveals some interesting patterns. Before 
the implementation of the policy fast-food restaurants focused mainly on reformulating 
products to be lower in sugar and fat however, these reformulations did not significantly 
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affect the calorie content of menu items. After the implementation of the policy restaurants 
shifted the focus of their reformulations towards decreasing calories. While fat and sugar 
were decreased to a lower extent they were still generally decreased on average. 
Furthermore, carbohydrates were also substantially decreased.  
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Table 6. Effects of Limited Service Restaurant Action on Nutritional Quality of 
Menu Items at U.S. Fast-Food Restaurants with more than 20 locations Before and 
After Nutrition Labelling Policy (May 2018), 2016-2019 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Calories 
  
Total Fat  
(g)  
Sugar  
(g)  
Carbo-
hydrates (g) 
Sodium  
(mg)  
        
Entry 
44.03*** 2.266*** 1.249*** 4.894*** 73.09*** 
(5.184) (0.363) (0.362) (0.612) (12.46) 
Entry*Post 
111.6*** 7.186*** -1.319* 6.316*** 236.7*** 
(8.596) (0.602) (0.607) (1.008) (20.72) 
Exit 
47.82*** 2.776*** 1.812*** 2.552*** 28.59* 
(5.191) (0.363) (0.372) (0.607) (12.48) 
Exit*Post 
-3.203 -0.487 -2.411** 1.400 62.79* 
(10.68) (0.746) (0.758) (1.250) (25.65) 
Entry*Exit 
-48.92*** 3.858*** 0.538 -5.327*** -68.72** 
(10.33) (0.723) (0.730) (1.219) (24.83) 
Entry*Exit 
*Post 
-50.15 -9.716*** 14.33*** 5.119 -245.0** 
(31.76) (2.220) (2.213) (3.868) (76.32) 
Reformulation 
-5.124 0.384 1.325*** -3.143*** -75.44*** 
(5.720) (0.401) (0.401) (0.692) (13.77) 
Reformulation*
Post 
37.93*** 1.245 -1.645* 5.263*** 200.6*** 
(10.79) (0.755) (0.759) (1.278) (26.05) 
Reformulation*
Exit 
-118.6*** -8.116*** 3.822*** -15.49*** -389.9*** 
(15.06) (1.053) (1.064) (1.788) (36.34) 
Reformulation*
Exit*Post 
126.6* 8.067* -1.540 17.48** 404.8** 
(54.74) (3.825) (3.775) (6.475) (131.6) 
Post 
-12.44*** -0.987*** -1.025*** -2.500*** -22.30*** 
(2.486) (0.174) (0.177) (0.296) (5.978) 
Constant 
243.3*** 7.717*** 6.365*** 32.03*** 308.1*** 
(6.344) (0.447) (0.453) (0.743) (15.25) 
Month, 
Restaurant, and  
Food Category  
Fixed Effects 
yes yes yes yes yes 
        
n 143,907  142,988  133,010  137,249  143,614  
        
Standard errors in parentheses         
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01 ***p<0.001       
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Table 7. Effects of Reformulation on Calories of Menu Items at U.S. Fast-Food 
Restaurants with more than 20 locations Before and After Nutrition Labelling 
Policy (May 2018), 2016-2019 
 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Calories  
Total Fat  
(g) 
Sugar  
(g) 
Carbo-
hydrates (g) 
Sodium  
(mg) 
Reformulation 
2.814 -9.253*** -3.791*** -1.235 80.94** 
(12.94) (1.247) (0.796) (1.398) (29.88) 
Reformulation*
Post 
-58.98* 6.579** 1.356 -7.362** -169.6** 
(24.42) (2.350) (1.502) (2.553) (56.44) 
Post 
80.98*** -7.087*** -4.664*** 6.618** 301.8*** 
(22.29) (2.146) (1.367) (2.346) (51.47) 
Constant 
406.0*** 20.82*** 15.55*** 52.46*** 569.3*** 
(33.35) (3.222) (2.055) (3.467) (77.06) 
Month, 
Restaurant, and  
Food Category  
Fixed Effects 
yes yes yes yes yes 
n 8,606 8,572 8,288 8,046 8,558 
Standard errors in parentheses         
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001     
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION 
Strategic Response of Fast-Food Restaurants 
While this reduced-form analysis can hardly reveal a causal effect of the policy the 
patterns it shows in restaurants actions do imply some interesting strategic responses by 
restaurants to nutrition labelling policy. First it would appear that if the policy has had its 
desired effect in reducing calorie content of fast-food menu items, this effect resulted in a 
reduction of at most only about 25 calories per menu item, one percent of the DRV.  
The three broad ways in which restaurants can alter the nutritional profile of their 
menus are introduction (entry), elimination (exit), and reformulation of menu items. Newly 
introduced products were substantially less healthful than other products and even more so 
after nutrition labelling in restaurants was mandated. While before the policy fast-food 
restaurants eliminated less healthful products this pattern did not substantially change after 
the introduction of the policy.  Fast-food restaurants reformulated items to be healthier in 
general and especially so after the policy.  
One potentially interesting explanation for these phenomena could be that 
restaurants are responding to consumers who desire healthful products but are poorly 
informed about nutrition. As such, restaurants strategies could entail marginally 
reformulating popular existing menu items to be marginally lower in calories and other 
overconsumed nutrients. However, at the same time introducing new products which are 
substantially higher in calories to serve as comparisons. Consumers who care about 
reducing their calorie intake will thus interpret existing menu items to be more healthful 
by comparison to newer items. However, this profit maximizing response could be 
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intended solely to appeal to consumers different preferences with regards to taste and 
nutrition. Even if this strategic response is the case, fast-food restaurants may have still 
provided healthier options and potentially reduced calorie consumption so the policy could 
still be interpreted as successful.  
Limitations  
We see many potential limitations with this initial analysis. First, while it is 
generally hard to establish causal impacts of a policy change, it is particularly challenging 
in our case. Restaurants exist in a complex market, each selling hundreds of different 
products and having a diverse range of specializations.  
Additionally, restaurants as well as consumer preferences constantly evolve over 
time, so it is important to control for time trend. Furthermore, the distinction between 
pre- and post-policy period becomes more subtle given that the policy was announced 
and later postponed (Bokamp, 2017).  
Another limitation is that our data is only on nutrition of menu items, with no 
sales information. This makes it difficult to evaluate the policy impacts on health. To 
counter this limitation, we take advantage of the fact that restaurants themselves observe 
sales and are likely to take that into consideration when making decisions related to the 
nutritional content of their products. Restaurants are likely to (1) drop items in low 
demand, (2) add items which they think will have high demand and (3) reformulate 
products to have higher demand than previously. Thus, by looking at product entry, exit 
and reformulation, we can also infer about popularity and sales.  
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While there are limitations to the current analysis, we hope to counter them with 
more robust analyses in the future. 
Extensions 
We have gathered a rich panel dataset on a representative subset of U.S. restaurants’ 
nutritional profiles. As such, the analysis presented in this paper is intended to serve as an 
initial exploration of this data. We intend to add more data to this analysis and expand our 
empirical methods to capture the causal effect of this policy more accurately. 
The obvious next step is to add more data to the analysis. First, we can add data 
for sit-down restaurants with more than 20 locations. It could be interesting to see if there 
is a differential effect across these two broad categories of restaurants.  
Furthermore, we have collected data on restaurants with fewer than 20 locations 
which are not directly mandated to follow the policy. To properly identify the policy 
impact, we will consider and compare restaurants with 20 or more locations (subject to 
policy) vs. those with less than 20 locations (not subject to policy). We believe that time 
trend is likely to be comparable across groups within each dimension, so difference-in-
differences estimates would allow us to tease out common time trend unrelated to the 
policy.  
While a broader look at restaurants could certainly be interesting another avenue of 
exploration is to take a more focused look at specific groups of restaurant chains and 
specific menu item categories. This could reveal patterns in strategic responses across these 
groups. 
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Additionally, it may be fruitful to develop a structural model of restaurant menu 
decisions from a nutritional standpoint. To this end, we seek to develop a robust model of 
supply-side forces which influence nutrition decisions by restaurants. This will further 
allow us to describe the causal effects of the policy and estimate welfare effects. 
Furthermore, the distinction of the policy being in effect simply after it was enacted in 
May 2018 (Post) is naïve. The policy was postponed multiple times (Bokamp, 2017). It is 
likely that restaurants strategic responses began earlier than the enaction of the policy. A 
more robust temporal analysis would allow us to capture the dynamic impacts over time, 
and properly evaluate the impact of actual policy vs. policy threat.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
Nutrition labelling in restaurants is a policy designed to inform consumers of the 
nutritional quality of the food they consume. As a result of this policy restaurants may 
choose to alter the nutritional content of their menu items. This thesis has sought to address 
fast-food restaurants’ strategic response to the mandate to label calorie content on their 
menus and menu boards. Given the importance of food away from home and specifically 
fast-food to American diets this response could have major consequences for American 
public health.  
Consumer responses to nutrition labelling are quite well documented in previous 
literature and find that consumers respond to them by reducing the number of calories they 
purchase but these responses vary demographically (Bollinger, Leslie, and Sorenson, 2010; 
Ebel, Kersh. Brescoll, and Dixon, 2009; Green, Brown, and Ohri-Vachaspati, 2015; 
Yamamoto et al. 2004). The limited research on the effects of nutrition labelling on 
restaurants food offerings is limited but generally finds that restaurants slightly reduce the 
calorie content of their menu items (Breummer, Krieger, Salens, and Chan, 2012; Nambla 
et al. 2013). The broader literature on quality disclosure finds that firms’ strategic responses 
to quality disclosure mandates can have intended and unintended consequences (Bennear 
and Olmstead ,2008; Dranove et al. ,2003; Ippolito and Mathios, 1990; Jacob, 2005; Jin 
and Leslie ,2003; Lu ,2012; Powers et al., 2011). 
This paper contributes primarily to the literature regarding firms’ strategic responses to 
nutrition labelling policy. Specifically addressing the recent nationally mandated nutrition 
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labelling policy for a large number of major fast-food restaurant chains. We find evidence 
of calorie reductions in average menu items across these restaurants, consistently with 
previous literature.  
Holistically assessing the various patterns in the ways that restaurants can change the 
nutritional profile of their menus, through introduction, elimination, and reformulation of 
menu items suggests intended and unintended consequences of this policy. If the policy 
has been successful in reducing the average calorie content of menu items, it would only 
have resulted in at most a modest reduction of 25 calories per item on average. This may 
have been accomplished through the reformulation of existing menu items to be more 
healthful, especially since the enaction of the policy, and elimination of particularly 
unhealthy items. However, while restaurants have altered their menus towards a lower-
calorie, fat, sugar, carbohydrate, and sodium composition they have also introduced new 
products which are particularly unhealthful. This introduction of unhealthful products 
increased in severity after the implementation of the policy. This suggests that fast-food 
restaurants may be appealing to consumers who care only for taste and/or magnifying the 
effect of their meager improvements to the existing menu with particularly unhealthy 
comparisons. 
Further research will seek to disaggregate a causal effect of the policy from general 
trends. Additionally, we seek to identify patterns of response across a broader range of 
restaurant sizes and specialties as well as focus on specific responses of groups of 
restaurants. In so doing we will identify restaurants’ strategic and competitive responses to 
the mandate to label calorie content of menu items on their menus and menu boards more 
accurately. 
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